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The Spend-and-Tax or Tax-and-Spend: Further 
Evidence for the Brazilian Imperial Period 
Fernando Zanella ∗ 
Abstract: »(Steuer) einnehmen und ausgeben oder ausgeben und (Steuer) ein-
nehmen: Weitere Einsichten zur imperialen Periode in Brasilien«. This article 
tests the flows of rents during the Brazilian Imperial period. To achieve this 
goal, a Vector of Error Correction Model (VECM) was employed to test long-
run and short-run relationships between government revenues and expendi-
tures. The VECM was applied for the entire imperial period with data available 
(1836-1889) and for the period after the Law Alves Branco (1844-1889), which 
more than doubled tariffs on imports. A trivariate causality test fails to show a 
casual relationship among the variables in any direction, regardless of the pe-
riod tested. When the augmented granger causality test is employed for the en-
tire period, results show a unidirectional causality from government expendi-
tures to revenues, a spend-to-tax model, and a bi-causality relationship for the 
1844-1889 period. 
Keywords: VECM; Imperial Brazil; Spend-and-Tax. 
I. Introduction 
Economic historians do not have the same amount and quality of information to 
conduct an investigation that a researcher has when dealing with recent events. 
Data is specially limited; therefore, studies are heavily based upon anecdotal 
evidence. Some quantitative evidence on the role played by different groups 
within a particular country may be obtained by examining the government 
budget. Due to lack of proper accountability, the government’s budget was 
once somewhat of a “black box”. Nevertheless, it is possible to inspect the 
“black-box” flow of rents. Eventually, it is feasible to determine the amount 
and speed of the inflows (government revenues) and of the outflows (govern-
ment expenditures). Such crucial information allows the researcher to go a step 
further, i.e., to investigate its dynamic and connect it with the roles played by 
different groups—in particular, the rent-seekers. That is precisely the objective 
of this paper. 
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This paper’s goal is to test the flows of rents during the Brazilian Imperial 
period (1822-1889). To achieve this goal, a Vector of Error Correction Model 
(VECM) was employed to test long-run and short-run relationships between 
government revenues and expenditures. In particular, we test the spend-to-tax 
(Peacock & Wiseman, 1979) or tax-to-spend (Friedman, 1978) models, as 
previously tested in the literature in several cases (for instance, Chang et. al, 
2002), including the Brazilian case (Mello, 2007). Nevertheless, such models 
were applied just once for the Brazilian Imperial period (Zanella, 2007) using a 
simple Granger bi-causality test. 
More precisely, this article tests the following hypotheses: 
1) Government revenues determine government expenditures. This is the tax-
to-spend hypothesis. 
2) Government expenditures determine government revenues. This is the 
spend-to-tax hypothesis. 
3) Previous government revenues determine expenditures, and government 
expenditures determine revenues. This is the hypothesis of bicausality or in-
terdependence between revenues and expenditures. 
4) There is no significant statistical relationship between government revenues 
and expenditures. This hypothesis suggests either independence or an unde-
termined statistical relationship between the variables.  
All the above four hypotheses will be tested in two ways. The first is the tri-
variate causality, in which immigration was added as an additional variable; the 
second is the augmented granger causality, in which the error correction term is 
added as an additional explanatory variable (Hatemi-J & Irandoust, 2001). 
The paper is divided as follows: the next section provides a concise review 
of the literature plus a short historical background on the Brazilian Imperial 
period. Section 3 describes the data and the method used along with the empiri-
cal results. The conclusion corroborates a long-run relationship between gov-
ernment expenditures and revenues, and it sheds lights on the roles played by 
different rent-seeking groups. 
II. Historical Background 
Brazil’s monarchy foundations were set when the Portuguese Crown fled Por-
tugal to Brazil in 1807. Portugal, allied with England, represented a breach in 
the continental blockage imposed by Napoleon. The entire crown—queen, 
prince, bureaucracy, nobles—fled Lisbon right before it fell to French troops. 
In March of 1808, 15,000 people arrived in Brazil. In 1821, King Dom João VI 
went back to Portugal leaving his son, Pedro, as the prince regent. In 1822, 
Dom Pedro I declared Brazil an independent country.  
The transfer of the totality of the Portuguese crown was meant to establish 
all the bureaucratic Portuguese apparatus on Brazilian territory. Such institu-
tional transplantation had consequences during the entire nineteenth century—
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the century in which Brazil began and finished with the same income per cap-
ita, i.e., a period of stagnant economic growth. For instance, Engerman & 
Sokoloff (1997) show that in 1800 the GDP per capita in Brazil was of $738; in 
1913, Brazil had basically the same GDP per capita, i.e., $700—an impressive 
century of zero growth.  
Besides the moderate power (the King), the Imperial government had the 
traditional legislative (upper and lower houses), judiciary and executive 
branches. The Council of State was particularly important, with a wide range of 
regulatory powers. The lower house was composed of elective members. All 
other positions were appointed and were paid directly or indirectly by the 
King—even at Provincial and municipal levels. That was also true for the ex-
ecutive and judiciary. Therefore, the crown had considerable leverage to en-
force mercantile regulations, unlike in the cases of England and the U.S. 
(Zanella et al, 2003; Ekelund & Tollison, 1997). Nonetheless, the Lower House 
wielded power on tax issues. As with the majority of countries during that time, 
participation in the Chamber was limited to wealthy and sometimes intellectual 
members of society. 
Tax on exports, properties and sales were unusual or limited. The govern-
ment relied basically on tax on imports; the crown supplemented its revenues 
by selling nobility titles (non-hereditary) and by currency debasement and 
seignoriage. After Brazil gained independence in 1822, taxes on goods im-
ported from Portugal and England were equalized at 15%, while other countries 
paid 24%. In 1844, the Council of State enacted the Law Alves Branco, which 
increased tariffs on imported goods to 30% (no similar goods being produced 
domestically) and 60% (similar goods being produced domestically). This 
characteristic of the law demonstrates the rent-seeker group’s influence. 
III. Data, Method and Empirical Results 
Testing the direction and speed of the inflows and outflows of the govern-
ment’s budget rents is one of the few quantitative tests available for the period. 
This information conveys evidence on the roles of different interest groups. It 
is possible to execute short- and long- run Granger causalities between gov-
ernment revenues and expenditures by implementing a VECM (Granger, 
1988). One limitation of a bivariate causality test is that a third variable may be 
simultaneously affecting the remaining variables, i.e. a misspecification bias. In 
this study, we add number of immigrants as the third variable, as it certainly 
affects government budget. Government revenues and expenditures plus num-
ber of immigrants are, to the extent of our knowledge, the only time series 
variables available for the study time frame. Immigration numbers are available 
as far back as 1836 from the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica 
(www.ibge.gov.br). Government revenues and expenditures were obtained 
from Mitchell (1983). Finally, a dummy variable was added to account for the 
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Paraguay war (1865-1870); in this period government spending suffered a 
drastic spike.  
The years just prior and after the war show a somewhat balanced budget, 
while in 1866 alone the expenditures are more than double the revenues. Dur-
ing the Paraguay war, Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina—with the support of 
England—fought against Paraguay. The last two years of the Imperial period, 
1888-9, show quite a discrepancy regarding government expenditures and 
revenues, similar to those war years. This is related with two major events: 
slavery abolishment (1888) and the Declaration of the Republic in late 1889. 
For this reason, we added two dummies for those years. After these dummies, 
our VEC show residuals with normal distribution (normality test reported in 
Table II). 
Government expenditures, revenues and immigration flows were normalized 
with natural logs. Next, all series were tested for unit roots. The Augmented 
Dick-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perrot (PP) tests were applied with 2 lag 
lengths, the same length as indicated by the unrestricted VAR; and 3 lag 
lengths, as indicated by the Box-Jenkins process; and 4 lags as the maximum 
chosen by Schwarz information criterion. In any situation, results—omitted for 
concision purposes—show that series are I(1) considering test 1% critical val-
ues.  
Final Prediction Error (FBE) and Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) were 
employed to test VAR lag length. FBE (0.000368) and AIC (-2.239360) results 
recommend 2 lag lengths at 5% level. Finally, the Johansen cointegration test 
was applied, as seen in Table I. Both trace test and max-eigenvalue test indicate 
1 cointegrating equation at 5% level.  
Table I: Johansen ML cointegration test 
Hypothesized # 
of CE(s) 
Trace Sta-
tistics 
0.05 critical 
value 
Max-Eigen 
Statistics 
0.05 critical 
value 
None*       23.534 15.494 21.554 14.262 
At most 1  1.979 3.841 1.979 3.841 
* Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5% level.  
 
The VECM included 2 lag lengths for expenditures and revenues, as indi-
cated by FBE and AIC tests on the unrestricted VAR. Additionally, two exoge-
nous variables were added. These are immigration, the only remaining time 
series available for the period, and a dummy to account for the Paraguay war. 
One lag length was added as well for both variables. Lastly, a VECM was run 
for the entire imperial period with data available (1836-1889) and for the pe-
riod after the Law Alves Branco (1844-1889) that more than doubled tariffs on 
imports, significantly changing government revenues. Table II below shows the 
cointegration equations plus the residual tests.  
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Table II: Cointegrating Vectors and residual tests 
 ∆ Exp(-1) ∆ Rev (-1) C Auto-
correlation
Hetero-
skedasticity
Normality 
Cointegration 1 12.426*** -0.538 1.870 45.676 1.681 
Eq. 1836-1889  (0.000)  (0.759) (0.684) (0.794) 
Cointegration 1 5.269*** -0.261 5.667 41.192 7.032 
Eq. 1844-1889  (0.000)  (0.225) (0.745) (0.134) 
Probabilities in between parenthesis; *** significant at 1% level; Autocorrelation: LM 
statistics with 3 lag lengths; Heteroskedasticity: White statistics with no cross-terms; 
Normality: Jarque-Bera statistics. ∆ denotes first difference; Exp= expenditures; Rev= 
revenues. 
 
Results for the long-run variables are shown in Table III below. Results are 
elucidative. For the whole period (1836-1889), ECT shows 19% and 32% 
adjustment towards the equilibrium after one period, with a significance of 5% 
and 1% respectively. This is a clear corroboration of the co-integration. When 
expenditure is the endogenous variable, it shows that previous expenditures 
were highly significant while impacting negatively on current expenditures. 
These somewhat surprising results show that the government had little alterna-
tive to balancing the budget than by containing subsequent expenditures, a hard 
budget constraint. Results were reinforced by a lagged war variable; the current 
war, as expected, increased government expenditures. When revenues comprise 
the endogenous variable besides ECT, the only significant variable—at 5% 
level—is revenues (-1). This indicates that an increase in revenues tends to 
perpetuate the new level.  
For the period after the tariffs increase (1844-1889), previous expenditures 
no longer had any effect on current expenditures, which was for the whole 
sample the most important factor along with war. These results suggest that 
after the tariffs increased, the crown did not balance the budget by cutting 
expenditures. Current expenditures were no longer negatively affected by pre-
vious expenditures—a government effort to contain expenditures—but were 
positively affected by previous revenues. War again shows the same effects as 
the previous model. When revenues were used as an endogeneous variable 
besides the highly significant ECT (1% level), only previous expenditures 
shows some positive effect. 
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Finally, short- and long- run causality tests were performed using Wald F-
statistics for the joint significance of the alternate casual variables; results are 
shown in Table IV. A trivariate causality test fails to show a statistical casual 
relationship among the variables in any direction, regardless of the period. 
When the augmented granger causality test is employed, results show a unidi-
rectional causality from government expenditures to revenues—a spend-to-tax 
model, for 1836-1889. The effect of government revenues plus error correction 
term on government expenditures is significant only at the 10% level, here is 
considered 5% as the acceptable reference. When the period between 1844-
1889 is analyzed, a bi-causality is corroborated at the 1% level. This is particu-
larly consistent with the increase of the import tariffs in 1844. 
Table IV: Results for short and long run Granger causality Tests 
Trivariate Gran-
ger Causality 
Augmented Granger 
Causality 
Trivariate Gran-
ger Causality 
Augmented Granger 
Causality 
1836-1889 1844-1889 
 
χ2 P χ2 P χ2 P χ2 P 
Rev and 
Imm on 
Exp 
4.50 0.34   5.54 0.23   
Exp and 
Imm on 
Rev 
2.47 0.65   2.47 0.65   
Rev and 
ECT on 
Exp 
  7.17 0.07*   19.70 0.00*** 
Exp and 
ECT on 
Rev 
  37.03 0.00***   18.71 0.00*** 
*** significance at 1%, * significance at 10%. ECT= error correction term; 
Exp= expenditures; Rev= revenues; Imm= immigration. 
 
Overall, the ECTs show that after 1844, variables expenditures and revenues 
move back to their long-run relationship quite quickly, with adjustments of 
86% and 73% in one period at 1% level significance. For the whole sample, 
containment of expenditures played an important role for the adjustment, while 
it had no significant impact after 1844. To contain expenditures meant a more 
difficult road. That is reflected with adjustments of 19% and 32% toward the 
equilibrium, a significant reduction in the adjustment dynamics. That is consis-
tent with the results of the augmented causality test, in which previously the 
tariff increase of 1844 was supportive of the spend-to-tax model. For the sub-
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sequent period, the augmented causality supports the bi-causality model at 1% 
level of significance either way. 
Conclusion 
Quantitative tests on historical events are restricted, due to data limitation. One 
of the few available tests for the Brazilian imperial period involved government 
revenues and expenditures. The imperial government budget has been analyzed 
before with the intention to unveil clues regarding the interests groups (Zanella, 
2007). The study showed that: a) in the Granger sense, the model supported 
was the spend-to-tax; and b) the government could not tax effectively because 
of local interest groups, in particular landowners. The study’s shortcoming was 
using a bivariate causality test; a third variable might have affected both gov-
ernment revenues and expenditures, causing a misspecification bias.  
The new study added immigration plus a dummy for war variables. Addi-
tionally, the sample was split to account for changes in tariffs in 1844. Fur-
thermore, a new model was used—the VECM that reveals short- and long- run 
relationships among the variables. In the short run, the trivariate causality tests 
do not show any statistical relationship between government expenditures and 
revenues. In the long run, the VECM supports the spend-to-tax hypothesis for 
the whole period. After the law Alves Branco (1844), the VECM shows a bi-
causality between revenues and expenditures. The new findings still support 
the idea that some pressure groups were safe from taxes. An emerging middle 
class, including a new wave of immigrants, were likely paying the new burden.  
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